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I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks are a class of networks based on
wireless technologies. An ad hoc network is a permanent or
temporary collection of nodes that can communicate with
each other. The distinguishing properties are that there is
no pre-existing infrastructure, that there is no central entity
to provide network administration services, and that end-
to-end communication may require routing information via
several intermediate nodes. This is why ad hoc networks are
sometimes referred to as multi-hop networks, where a hop is
a direct link between two nodes. If wireless communication
is being used, then two nodes are within one hop of each
other if they lie in each other’s transmission range.
Mobility introduces a major design constraint not present
in wired networks, namely the need for energy efficiency.
The consequence of this is that network services must be
efficient, and must also take account of nodes which do not
have enough energy to participate. An example of where
this can give rise to a security threat is provided by the
routing service in the network layer. Routing is a distributed
operation in ad hoc networks, where every node can act as
a router. In a previous paper on threat models [19], failed
nodes are defined as those nodes which do not have enough
resources to generate or forward data packets, and such nodes
may often occur through battery exhaustion.
However, there is a related class of threats to routing aris-
ing from selfish nodes, who try to exploit the routing protocol
to their own advantage. The primary motivation for their
unhelpful behaviour is to enhance their own performance and
to save their own energy resources. In ad hoc networks, the
main threat from such nodes comes from the selfish dropping
of packets, which can severely affect the performance of the
network [15]. Selfish nodes may also attempt to gain a better
quality of service by reserving routes and bandwidth by not
responding to routing messages. The key difference between
failed and selfish nodes is that selfish nodes have the ability
and resources to forward packets, whereas failed nodes do
not.
The motivation for selfish behaviour in a commons such
as an ad hoc network is discussed in [8]. If a node feels
that it can gain more benefit by behaving selfishly and
refusing to perform services then it will do so. Current
network technology typically assumes, quite correctly, that
most devices cooperate in routing information. However in
the future this may not be the case. This is due, in part,
to network devices becoming smaller, more personal, and
customisable through software downloads.
Hence, one requirement for the network layer would be to
prevent selfish behaviour, or to at least detect selfish nodes
so that the network can react appropriately. Prevention, by
forcing nodes to forward data packets, is extremely difficult.
Thus detection of selfish behaviour is a problem which has
been the subject of much recent research interest [3], [4],
[16].
A second requirement is to detect failed nodes and to
exclude them, so that they are not used whilst they are failed.
Failed nodes are of no use for routing, but the protocol should
support their ability to recharge and come back online.
This paper1 presents a hybrid ad hoc routing protocol
which uses a 2-hop acknowledgement mechanism to detect
and react to both failed and selfish nodes. The protocol
then uses a route selection method to increase the network’s
tolerance of selfish and failed nodes. The protocol is hybrid
as it uses both proactive and reactive mechanisms [20].
In particular, each node proactively maintains a topological
view of all nodes which are a maximum of two hops away.
When a node requires a route to a destination node not within
two hops, a reactive route discovery mechanism is used.
The following terms are used in this document, but may
be used differently elsewhere. A node is a device with a
network interface that is participating in routing in a mobile
ad hoc network. It may or may not be mobile, and may also
be part of another network. It is important to realise that a
node can actually be a large network, or it could be just a
single mobile device such as a mobile phone. An originator
node is a node which originates a data packet, intended for
1The work reported in this paper has formed part of the Networks
& Services area of the Core 2 Research Programme of the Virtual
Centre of Excellence in Mobile & Personal Communications, Mo-
bile VCE, www.mobilevce.com, whose funding support, including
that of EPSRC, is gratefully acknowledged. Fully detailed technical
reports on this research are available to Industrial Members of
Mobile VCE.
a certain destination node. A node is a neighbour node of
another node if it is only one hop away, i.e. within direct
transmission range. Likewise, a 2-hop neighbour node is a
node which is two hops away. If the destination node is not
a neighbour node of the originator node, the data packet will
have to traverse a multi-hop route consisting of intermediate
nodes. In a specific scenario, the sending node is the last
node to send the data packet. Data packets are unicast in
this protocol except where indicated otherwise. A routing
message is any packet used by the routing protocol to affect
routing information.
II. THE 2-HOP ACKNOWLEDGED ROUTING PROTOCOL
The 2-Hop Acknowledged Routing Protocol (2HARP) is
based on the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [7]. Proactive
routing is performed locally, and reactive routing is used to
discover routes outside of the proactive routing zone. The rest
of this section gives an overview of 2HARP, after outlining
some important issues and assumptions. Full details of the
final scheme will depend on the results of ongoing simulation
studies.
A. Important Issues and Assumptions
An adversarial environment is assumed, where every
neighbour node is potentially failed or selfish, e.g. a multi-
domain ad hoc network where nodes do not trust each other.
The threat that the 2HARP protocol addresses is posed by
those selfish nodes which refuse to forward data for other
nodes, but continue to send their own data into the ad hoc
network for routing. The other type of selfish behaviour, not
dealt with by 2HARP, is where a node does not participate
in any operation in the ad hoc network. This threat cannot
be tackled solely within the network layer, where the end
user’s view is of paramount importance. Possible solutions
are a policy whereby a user will not receive the full range
of services if they do not fully involve their ad hoc device
in the network, or the user will receive billing discounts if
they do play a full part in supporting network operation.
Identity and address resolution is an important issue which
is outside the scope of this paper. In order to describe the
routing protocol more easily, it will be assumed that each
node has only one network interface operating using 2HARP,
and therefore has only one identifiable address.
The use of a single identifier implicitly reveals another
important assumption. We suppose that each node cannot
connect to the network using a false identifier, or masquerade
as another node, i.e. the ownership of an address is trusted.
This may require peer-to-peer entity authentication in the
underlying data-link layer. How this might be efficiently
achieved in a multi-domain ad hoc environment is a major
issue in itself, and while some suggestions are given, this is
not the main purpose of this paper.
The paper also assumes that each node has the capability
to digitally sign each packet it sends and also verify the
signatures of each other node in the network. This might, for
example, be achieved by equipping each node with a public
key certificate signed by a common certification authority,
and exchanging certificates in the messages used by the
Neighbour Sensing Protocol (see below). Digital signatures
provide origin authentication, so that a node can always be
sure that it has received a data packet from the claimed
source. This is a fundamental service which is needed to
enhance the security techniques in the 2HARP protocol.
Digital signatures can also provide data integrity. The specific
details of the mechanisms used are outside of the scope of
this paper.
One further assumption related to digital signatures is
that each node will have a private/public key pair. For the
moment, the paper also assumes that a public key is bound
to only one node. Key distribution and management are not
the main subject of this paper.
Attacks are possible on the OSI/ISO physical and data-
link layers [14]. This paper assumes that either security
mechanisms exist in the lower layers to make such attacks
too expensive to perform, or that such attacks are unlikely.
If this were not the case, then the availability of any routing
protocol would suffer severely from denial of service attacks.
B. Fundamentals of the Protocol
Each node following the protocol maintains a Routing
Table and an Acknowledgement Table. The Routing Table
contains information about the node’s neighbours, including
which neighbour to use to route information to a certain
destination node. The Acknowledgement Table is used to
store information about packets which are awaiting an ac-
knowledgement. The two tables are populated during the
operation of the routing protocol, which is divided into three
phases — neighbour sensing, route discovery and data packet
sending.
C. The Neighbour Sensing Protocol
The proactive Neighbour Sensing Protocol is a modifi-
cation of the neighbour sensing function of the Optimised
Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [5], which allows nodes
to discover who is in their 2-hop neighbourhood. This is
achieved by all nodes advertising their 1-hop neighbourhoods
to each other. Associativity is important so new nodes are
only accepted as neighbours if they can demonstrate that
they can maintain a permanent link for a certain period of
time. This part of the protocol is proactive, as each node has
to periodically broadcast updates indicating any changes to
their 1-hop neighbourhood.
D. The Route Discovery Cycle
The second phase is the reactive Route Discovery Cycle,
used to discover new routes when they are needed. If a node
requires a route to a destination which is not within the
node’s 2-hop neighbourhood, it broadcasts a Route Request
message, which contains the addresses of both the originating
node and the destination node. The 1-hop neighbours will
reply to the node with a Request Acknowledgement message
stating which of their neighbour nodes (i.e. the originator
node’s 2-hop neigbours) will be able to propagate the Route
Request further. Those 1-hop neighbours who replied also
forward the Route Request to the 2-hop neighbours they
advertised. These 2-hop neighbours will perform the same
steps and send a Request Acknowledgement to the 1-hop
node from which they received the Route Request. The 1-
hop node will then forward on the acknowledgements to the
originator node. These acknowledgements form the basis of
deciding which 1-hop neighbour nodes to use where multiple
routes exist. Route Requests are only processed if they are
received from, or are for, responsive neighbours. See section
II-F for more information on how this is used.
Every node along the route uses the 2-hop acknowledge-
ment to determine if its neighbour is selfish or failed, until
the Route Request reaches the destination node. See figure
1 for an illustration of a general example. Here a Route
Request, Route Reply or data packet has been sent by node
A, destined for node F , where all nodes know the route to
send packets for node F . All nodes must respond with a
signed acknowledgement (Ackx) where x is the node which
signed the message. Each message is prefixed with a number
to demonstrate the order in which the messages will be
sent. Only the destination node itself can generate a Route
Reply, which is propagated back towards the originator node
using the same acknowledgement mechanism as for Route
Requests.
If a node does not receive a Request Acknowledgement
message within time t, it may resend the Route Request up
to a maximum of s times. It is important that the node
performs a exponential backoff by doubling the value of
t every time. The receipt of a duplicate Route Request is
an indication that the neighbour node did not receive the
Request Acknowledgement, so a 1-hop node will know it
will have to rebroadcast the acknowledgement.
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Fig. 1. A generalisation of the 2-hop acknowledgement mechanism.
As Route Requests are received, nodes can extract the
orginator node’s address to record a reverse path, i.e. the
node from which the Route Request was received is recorded
as the next hop towards the originator node. The converse
is true when receiving Route Replies, where the node from
which the Route Reply was received is recorded as the next
hop towards the destination node. This mechanism is also
used in the Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
[17] routing protocol. Another feature of AODV which is
employed in 2HARP is the use of unique sequence numbers
to discard duplicate or old Route Requests so that routing
loops do not occur.
E. Sending Data Packets
Finally, the third phase involves sending data packets using
the discovered routes. This uses the same acknowledgement
mechanism as in Route discovery, where a node that is 2
hops down the route must produce an acknowledgement that
the data packet was received, and send it 2 hops upstream.
Data packets are only forwarded if they have been received
from responsive nodes.
Once a node has received a data packet with a specific
(originator node, destination node) pair, it should always use
the same route for all traffic between these two nodes. If a
node receives a packet and discovers that the default route has
broken (i.e. its link with the 1-hop neighbour node no longer
exists), the node can use an alternative route if permitted in
the data packet header and the packet has not been rerouted
before. If there is no alternative route or the data packet
is not to be retransmitted, then the node must perform route
maintenance. Here, the node upstream of the break will have
to generate a Route Error message and route it back towards
the originator of the data packet. Upon verification of the
Route Error, nodes can decide whether or not to discover a
new route.
F. Coping with Selfishness
The following route selection mechanism is proposed
for use with 2HARP when multiple routes exist to one
target destination. A node should try each alternative route
when the default route fails, using the reputations of each
neighbour node as an indicator of which 1-hop node to
choose.
A node that requests its neighbour to send a Route Re-
quest message or data packet will give the 1-hop neighbour
node retry opportunities to do so before it will decrease
that neighbour’s reputation. While the reputation remains
positive, the node may try to use the neighbour node, but it
will give it less retry attempts, according to the neighbour’s
reputation. If the reputation of the 1-hop neighbour node
becomes less than zero, then that neighbour will be marked
as ‘unresponsive’.
When no acknowledgements have been missed by a 1-hop
neighbour for the past y consecutive messages sent, the node
should increase the 1-hop node’s reputation. After a certain
number (i) of messages, the reputation of the neighbour
should be reset to the original value2. Negative behaviour
has a greater effect than positive behaviour, to allow 2HARP
to detect negative behaviour more quickly.
In order to take into account the possibility that an
unresponsive node may be a failed rather than a selfish node,
the node will wait an amount of time k before giving the
excluded neighbour another retry = 1 opportunities, if it
has packets to route through the unresponsive node. The
node should exponentially backoff after every unsuccessful
2This makes it more difficult for a malicious node to build up
a good reputation to enable it to behave selfishly without being
excluded for a sustained period.
attempt at trying to get the neighbour to forward a packet.
Thus failed nodes, and even ‘repentant’ selfish nodes, are
permitted to become involved in routing again should they
overcome their previous problem with forwarding packets.
The period of time k is doubled so that resources are not
repeatedly wasted testing a node which is still failed or
selfish. Thus it is important that the Routing Table entry for
an unresponsive 1-hop node is not immediately deleted.
III. PROTOCOL DESIGN ISSUES
This section discusses the mechanisms used to achieve
the main aim of the protocol, namely detecting and reacting
to failed and selfish nodes. Future work will also address
performance issues including network flooding of Route
Requests, intermediate nodes replying to Route Requests,
and the choice of a hybrid scheme.
A. Detecting Failed and Selfish Nodes
The main design criterion for 2HARP was that it should
detect and react to selfish behaviour in a reliable way.
Without a proactive scheme the 2-hop acknowledgement
mechanism would fail. A node will need to know who its
2-hop neighbours are, in order to know from whom to expect
2-hop acknowledgements. However, the proactive Neighbour
Sensing Protocol by itself does not completely solve this
problem, so additional mechanisms are needed.
The digital signature mechanism has been included to
provide origin authenticity, where the process has been made
more robust through the use of unique sequence numbers.
The primary use of unique sequence numbers is to provide
protection against replay attacks. They can also be used to
further decrease the likelihood of a successful masquerade at-
tack, analogously to the RAND value in GSM authentication
[6]. Thus good management of sequence numbers in 2HARP
will ensure that a node’s sequence numbers monotonically
and randomly increase. This additional complexity will help
to discourage potential masquerade attacks.
Another threat arises where the 1-hop node is responsive,
but the 2-hop node is unresponsive when forwarding data
packets. Thus, the 0-hop node will receive an acknowledge-
ment from the 1-hop node, but not the 2-hop node. This
should not be possible in 2HARP, as the 1-hop node should
detect that the 2-hop node is unresponsive from its own
communications with the 2-hop node, which would result
in it being removed from the list of responsive nodes it
periodically distributes to its 1-hop neighbours. However,
there is a small possibility that a 1-hop node does not know
that a 2-hop node is unresponsive if, for example, it has
never asked the 2-hop node to forward any packets. In the
case where a 0-hop node sends a packet for forwarding,
and the 1-hop node only has the one 2-hop neighbour to
whom to forward the packet, the 2-hop will be marked as
unresponsive by the 1-hop node, and the 1-hop node will be
labelled as unresponsive by the 0-hop node. This has different
consequences for each of the parties involved. The 0-hop
node will gain from the situation as it knows it cannot use
that 1-hop node to send packets to the destination. However,
the 1-hop and 2-hop nodes’ communication with the 0-hop
node will be severely restricted while they are marked as
unresponsive. Therefore, it is the responsibility of each node
to make sure it knows which of its neighbours are being
unresponsive, and to advertise these within the Neighbour
Sensing Protocol. Further research will be needed to see if
this can be achieved by other means.
A selfish node can also decide not to send messages to
indicate that it has discovered new neighbour nodes. Cur-
rently, there is no explicit mechanism to prevent this attack
succeeding. The impact of this threat will depend on the
density of nodes as, the more nodes there are, the less effect
the selfish node’s actions will have. Again, where failed
nodes are unable to send Neighbourhood Update messages,
neighbour nodes will in any case be unable to use failed
nodes as a next hop to new 2-hop nodes.
It would be disadvantageous for a selfish node to not
advertise unresponsive or expired neighbours, as another
neighbour could route through the selfish node and still
expect acknowledgements from the non-cooperating or non-
existent 2-hop neighbours.
B. Reacting to Failed and Selfish Nodes
The ideal situation would be a protocol where ad hoc
nodes could trade energy for every data packet forwarded.
There would then be no motivation for selfish behaviour, and
failed nodes may also be of little consequence. However, the
technology to achieve this does not exist.
The problem with untrusted, multi-domain ad hoc net-
works is that one node cannot control how a message is sent
by another node; it is only possible to gain assurance that it
has been sent. In 2HARP, this assurance is gained through the
receipt of 2-hop acknowledgement messages. The reputation
mechanism used is a simple technique utilised by many
protocols, where it is rarely described as a reputation scheme,
as the term itself was introduced after these mechanisms were
devised.
Preventing the participation of selfish nodes is a local
access control mechanism adapted for use in 2HARP, where
failed and selfish nodes are marked as unresponsive and are
therefore unauthorised to participate. By preventing selfish
nodes from sending data packets, the protocol tries to change
their objective from saving power to exchanging information,
the essence of networking. A node marked as unresponsive
cannot send Route Requests, Replies, or data packets, and
thus cannot be the target of any Route Requests. However,
the protocol allows data packets to be sent to a selfish node.
The reasoning behind this is to cater for the possibility of
failed nodes, which may not have enough power to send
packets, but may still receive packets.
There is a delicate trade-off between the existence of
selfish and failed nodes. Ideally, the protocol would not even
allow information to reach selfish nodes but, to achieve this,
the protocol would need a mechanism which could discover
a neighbour node’s energy levels in a secure way. This would
prevent a selfish node pretending that it does not have enough
energy to forward packets.
Failed nodes which cannot forward packets are of no use
in ad hoc networks. Hence, 2HARP detects them and stops
other nodes from using them, to allow failed nodes to recover
without the additional burden of having to deal with Route
Requests, etc.
However, there are still unaddressed issues in 2HARP.
A node can be selectively selfish towards some of its
neighbours, as reputation is a local calculation. Also, if a
selfish node does not object to having its communication
links severed, there is nothing that 2HARP currently does to
force a selfish node to forward packets. These issues will be
discussed further in section VI.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents a threat analysis summary of 2HARP,
in the context of the other two threat classes in the threat
model of [19], namely badly failed and malicious nodes.
Badly failed nodes can introduce false routing messages,
which are still correctly formatted, but contain false informa-
tion. The threat of false routing messages can also come from
malicious nodes, who aim to deliberately disrupt the correct
operation of the routing protocol, denying network services if
possible. There are no explicit mechanisms within 2HARP to
protect against these threats; further work, discussed below,
will be needed to design mechanisms to do so.
Any false routing messages sent in the Neighbour Sensing
Protocol will cause nodes to waste resources, and misdirect
traffic by setting up false routes. However, 2HARP differs
from other routing protocols in that false information will
be confined to a 2-hop neighbourhood, preventing its spread
throughout the whole network. As the Routing Tables are
periodically updated using fresh information, any false route
information only remains during the period in which a node
is sending false routing messages.
The use of digital signatures makes it difficult for ma-
licious nodes to introduce false 2-hop nodes, as in order
to maintain the pretence of the non-existent 2-hop nodes,
the malicious 1-hop neighbour would have to generate pri-
vate/public key pairs for each of those 2-hop neighbour nodes
and respond to any messages using the private key associated
with a non-existent 2-hop node to create a signature. This
will be computationally expensive and will therefore use up
a significant amount of resource, maybe more than will be
wasted by the 1-hop nodes that the malicious node is trying
to attack.
The effect of false messages is mitigated by the use of
explicit Neighbour Sensing messages, the fact that they are
only trusted if they have been received several times within
a certain number of update periods, and the requirement for
digital signatures. These mechanisms also help to prevent
the realisation of other threats such as wormhole attacks
[10, p2]. However, a badly failed or malicious node will
be able to send routing messages to cause other attacks. For
example, Route Requests for nodes which do not exist, or
for nodes known to be unresponsive, could be generated and
sent. This is an example of a denial of service attack, also
known as the sleep deprivation torture attack [18, p4]. This is
an important threat as the false Route Request will propagate
and cause nodes to waste resources trying to process it.
There is currently no mechanism in 2HARP to prevent this
from happening, since it has been designed to detect non-
forwarding behaviour; this is a topic for further research.
A malicious node could send a Route Error message in
response to a data packet it receives. This will force the
originator of the corresponding data packet to believe that
delivery to the destination has not been possible. 2HARP
does not prevent this but, again, a node may not wish to send
packets along a route involving a malicious node. 2HARP
limits the influence of this attack because a malicious node
needs a current data packet in order to generate a valid Route
Error message. Thus the malicious node has to be involved
in the route of the data packet.
Finally, messages could be sent by a malicious node using
a false source address, to masquerade as another node. This
could be addressed if the public key of each node is securely
bound to their address, and this will also be the subject of
future work.
V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The 2HARP protocol could be implemented either in
dedicated hardware or software. However, there are potential
concerns arising from the implementation of digital signa-
tures in software in mobile devices, due to the amount of
computational power needed.
The computational complexity of signature operations can
be significantly reduced by using techniques such as elliptic
curve signature schemes, for example EC-DSA as stan-
dardised in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [11], or the NTRU signature
scheme [9]. It has been demonstrated that signing using such
schemes can be implemented on very limited devices, e.g.
smart cards without a dedicated cryptographic processor. The
storage complexity (for public and private keys) can also
be reduced by using elliptic curve signature schemes, where
keys are quite compact.
Transmission complexity can be significantly reduced by
using either elliptic curve schemes (for which signatures are
inherently short) or any signature scheme giving (partial)
message recovery, e.g. one of the schemes standardised in
ISO/IEC 9796-2 or 9796-3 [12], [13], as used in the EMV
industry standard for integrated circuit cards [1]. In the
latter case, adding a signature to a message can add as
little as 25 bytes to the message length. Similar techniques,
again employed in EMV, can be used to make public key
certificates only 40-50 bytes longer than the public key.
VI. FURTHER WORK
More research is needed to to see if the threats identified in
section IV can be addressed in the network layer. If not, other
mechanisms may be needed, where one possible solution
could lie with mobile agents.
2HARP is currently being tested via simulation work to
assess its performance, and to see whether it achieves its
main goals in different scenarios. These include wireless
sensor networks where the emphasis is on organisation of
sensed information, and in energy constrained routing where
metrics based on available energy are more important than
other attributes such as shortest path. Simulations will also
be used to test how the performance of the upper layers
is affected, e.g. TCP connection-oriented communication,
especially if the ad hoc network is going to operate with
other IP-based networks. Finally, the possibility of adapting
the mechanisms of 2HARP to operate with other protocols,
such as the Intrazone Routing Protocol (IARP), part of the
hybrid Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [7], will be considered.
Future research will look at the feasibility of turning 2HARP
from a protocol reactive to threats to a protocol which can
prevent selfish behaviour.
In parallel with this, work will be undertaken on provid-
ing a security architecture for 2HARP and other security
mechanisms in mobile ad hoc networks. Key management
and distribution is a vast topic, which is critical to the
successful operation of 2HARP and many other proposed
security mechanisms. Arkko et al. [2] have proposed the use
of Address Based Keys (ABK) in IPv6 Neighbour Discovery,
where the node address is used to generate the public key.
This may be an interesting starting point for an infrastructure
which will be difficult to manage due to the lack of an
online central entity. Other techniques will be investigated
to improve the efficiency of 2HARP, including the use of
location based services and the broadcasting of a mobility
warning message when a node moves.
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